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Abstract
We investigate several versions of a simple game of sexual selection,
to explore the role of secondary sexual characters (the “handicap paradox”)
with the tools of signaling theory. Our models admit closed form solutions.
They are very much inspired by Grafen (1990)’s seminal companion papers.
By merging and simplifying his two approaches, we identify a not so minor
artifact in the seminal study. We propose an alternative model to start with
Grafen’s sexual selection theory, with several similarities with Getty (1998).
1 Introduction
Sexual selection was introduced by Charles Darwin as a mechanism complemen-
tary to natural selection in shaping evolution. In short, the number of offspring
to any individual is a function of both of its survivorship, the source of natural
selection, and its mating success, the source of sexual selection.
The investigation of sexual selection has been dominated by that of the role
of secondary sexual characters, and by the “handicap paradox” —not to be mis-
taken with the “handicap principle” to be described hereafter. The paradox is that
secondary sexual characters that seem to attract individuals of the other sex, often
male characters attracting females, seem excessively developed, with a negative
impact on the viability of the animals bearing them. Since females attracted by
these males run the risk of having ill-adapted male progeny, such a preference
should be counter-selected.
∗Emeritus senior scientist, BIOCORE team, INRIA-Sophia Antipolis-Me´diterrane´e, France.
†Lecturer at AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Rennes, France.
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There has been a very large literature discussing this topic, proposing several
possible mechanisms to explain the paradox. We refer to [11, 9] for classifica-
tions of the proposed mechanisms, and to the review [12] and the bibliography
therein. Over-simplifying, two mechanisms are in competition in the literature:
the so called “Fisherian runaway” dynamic mechanism, see [4, 13], and Zahavi’s
static, or equilibrium, “handicap principle” [18, 8, 7].
Zahavi’s intuition was made precise in a mathematical model by Grafen [8, 7].
In [8], he develops a model in terms of population genetics. In [7], the handicap
principle results from an analysis of the role of secondary sexual characters as
signals, in the framework of signaling theory, a branch of game theory. This model
is one of direct benefits in the classification of [12] (or direct selection D in the
classification of [11]). Yet, in [12], the handicap principle is quoted as belonging
to the family of indirect benefits, more specifically the “good gene” mechanism 1.
In this study, and consistent with, e.g. [5], we will not need to decide whether
the quality of males is genetic or environment dependent. The only thing that
matters is that females have a benefit in reproductive efficiency to mate with good
males, either because these are more fertile (a “direct” effect) leading to a larger
progeny at the first generation, or because their own offspring will have a larger
fitness (an indirect “good gene” effect: larger survivorship or better mating success
—“sexy son”—), leading to a larger progeny at the second generation.
We shall develop an asymmetrical model where males signal to attract females.
It is known that this is not always the case; the reverse exists, and even cases of
mutual signaling are well documented, a most famous example being in the Great
Crested Grebe Podiceps cristatus, which form stable pairs. But, following the main
trend in the literature, we will assume that males keep foraging for mates, and
that they have a potential reproduction rate much larger than what the number of
females allow, so that one may consider that they can mate an arbitrary number of
times. As a consequence, even if females are unequally fertile, there is no point for
males to be choosy, and therefore no evolutionary pressure on females to develop
signals of their quality. In contrast, females are assumed to mate only once per
breeding season. Hence if males are of unequal qualities, there is a reproductive
benefit for females in being choosy, and therefore evolutionary pressure on males
to develop signals of their quality.
In this line of thought, our model may be viewed as a simple synthesis of
Grafen’s [7, 8] to be revisited. As in [7], we will use reproductive efficiency as the
payoff of the game; however, inspired by the companion paper [8], we will use a
mechanistic model, with explicit mating dynamics, for reproductive efficiency.
1However, the explanation of the handicap principle in [12] contains a mistake concerning the
transitivity of positive correlations.
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One major simplification compared to Grafen’s model [8] is that we do not
allow females’ fecundity to vary during the breeding season. A minor difference
is that we deal with viability in a somewhat different way. While Grafen’s exam-
ple deals with a probability to survive the pre-breading season, which better fits
semelparous species, we deal with an expected number of breeding seasons, which
extends the model to iteroparous species as well ([15], [5]). We also use from the
start two simplifications of Grafen’s model which he uses in the example that he
solves numerically: a uniform distribution of males’ qualities and a fecundity of fe-
males proportional to their mate’s quality. As a benefit, we gain explicit solutions,
through significantly simpler derivations.
We investigate first a model where these are essentially the only differences
with Grafen’s. Then we propose a second model, using ideas close to those of [5],
but again more explicit, to circumvent an undesirable feature in Grafen’s model
pertaining to the lower bound of admissible males’ quality.
In Section 2, we give a quick account of the basics of signaling game theory,
including the very simple derivation of what we call the handicap principle. In
Section 3, we develop two variants of each of our two models of sexual selection,
which all turn out to have explicit equilibrium strategies, simplifying the discussion
of the model’s conclusions.
2 Signaling
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Motivation and intuition
We consider the secondary sexual characters under investigation as “signals”, i.e.
means by which a male communicates to females his “quality”, a “private” pa-
rameter that females cannot observe directly, in order to attract them. Hence their
primary role is of carrying information.
The investigation of situations where two “players”, here males and females,
interact, and where one has to rely on the observed actions of the other one to re-
cover some missing information about him, is the object of signaling game theory.
We investigate equilibrium situations, which needs not be always the case in bio-
logical signaling. We assume that all the decision and signal variables range over
a continuum, plus some technical assumptions to be given hereafter. The “private”
parameter of player one, denoted θ in the next section, will be males’ quality q in
the sexual selection models.
In essence, the explanation of the handicap paradox via signaling theory, the
so-called “handicap principle”, simply states that, if reproductive success is max-
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imized by the selective pressure of evolution, and if it is a function of both life
expectancy and mating success, and if the marginal effect of the signal size on
mating success is positive, its marginal effect on survivorship has to be negative to
balance the first one and get zero marginal value at equilibrium ([5]).
Another intuition, which is equally valid, is that if the signal were “cheap”, a
low-quality male could, for free, mimic a high quality one and so doing improve
his pay-off, contradicting the equilibrium hypothesis.
In the next subsections, we give a short account of signaling theory, that we
need to proceed.
2.1.2 A signaling game
A simple signaling game is as follows. There are two players, 1 and 2, choosing
their decisions u1 and u2 in decision sets U1 and U2 respectively, most often sets
of mixed strategies.
The payoffs of the players are functions Ji(θ, u1, u2), i = 1, 2, of the decisions
and of a parameter θ belonging to some set Θ. But θ is a “private information” of
player 1, i.e. player 1 is able to choose his control via a strategy ψ1 as u1 = ψ1(θ),
while player 2 does not know θ.
The game proceeds as follows: player 1 plays first. His decision u1 creates,
possibly via a noisy —probabilistic— mechanism, a signal s observed by player
2. Then player 2 plays, and he is allowed to choose his decision u2 as a function
of the signal, say u2 = ψ2(s).
The rules of the game, the sets Θ, U1, U2, the criteria J1 and J2, and the
mechanism that generates s as a function of θ and u1, leading to a probability law
P1(s | θ, u1), are common knowledge. (i.e. both players know them and know
that the other one knows, . . . , ad infinitum.) But player 2 does not know θ, nor the
realizations of the random variables involved in generating s.
Finally, we are compelled to adopt Harsanyi’s device for games of incomplete
information: both players share an a priori distribution law, say P0, upon θ.
The interesting feature of that kind of game is that in making his decision,
player 1 should take into account the information about his private data that he is
leaking to player 2 through his own decision.
Pure signaling game We shall consider a simplified form of signaling game,
called pure signaling game, where, on the one hand, J2 does not depend directly
on u1, so that player two is only interested in the informational content of u1,
which, on the other hand, he exactly observes, with no uncertainty.
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2.1.3 Bayesian equilibrium
We now describe what we consider as an equilibrium of this game, called a bayesian
equilibrium, the natural extension of the Nash equilibrium to signaling games.
First form Player 2 will form a conjecture as to how player 1 has formed his
decision, of the form u1 = χ(θ). Using that conjecture and the signal s, he will
update his probability distribution over θ according to Bayes rule, producing a
conditional law P2(θ | s):
P2(θ | s) =
P1(s | θ, χ(θ))P0(θ)∫
P1(s | η, χ(η))P0(dη)
.
He then chooses u2 = ψ2(s) to maximize his expected pay-off, i.e. such that
∀u2 ∈ U2 , E
P2(θ|s)J2(θ, χ(θ), ψ2(s)) ≥ E
P2(θ|s)J2(θ, χ(θ), u2) .
Assume that player 1 has correctly “guessed” player 2’s conjecture χ. He then
knows completely how player 2 will construct his decision. i.e., the function ψ2.
He may choose his own decision u1 = ψ1(θ) to maximize his own expected pay-
off, i.e. such that,
∀u1 ∈ U1 , E
P1(s|θ,ψ1(θ))J1(θ, ψ1(θ), ψ2(s)) ≥ E
P1(s|θ,u1)J1(θ, u1, ψ2(s)) .
(1)
Definition 1 The pair (ψ1, ψ2) is a bayesian equilibrium if, in the above construc-
tion,
∀θ ∈ Θ , ψ1(θ) = χ(θ) . (2)
In words: even knowing player 2’s conjecture χ, player 1 cannot do better than
using that same decision rule.
Remark 1 It is not necessary, in defining a bayesian equilibrium, to introduce a
different name for player 2’s conjecture χ and player 1’s decision rule ψ1, since
we want them to coincide. But doing so helps to stress that χ is part of player 2’s
strategy. As usual, a Nash-like equilibrium can be viewed as a fixed point: ψ1 is a
function ψ1 = F(χ) and a bayesian equilibrium should satisfy F(ψ1) = ψ1. At
equilibrium, it holds that
P2(θ | s) =
P1(s | θ, ψ1(θ))P0(θ)∫
P1(s | η, ψ1(η))P0(dη)
. (3)
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Second form A simplification arises if J2 is independent from u1. In that case,
instead of forming a conjecture on player one’s strategy, player 2 may use the
signal s to form a conjecture, called a belief, on θ in the form of a probability law
P2(θ | s). Then, he chooses his strategy ψ2(s) such that,
∀u2 ∈ U2 , E
P2(θ|s)J2(θ, ψ2(s)) ≥ E
P2(θ|s)J2(θ, u2) .
If player 1 correctly infers this strategy, he may choose a strategy ψ1(θ) such that,
as previously equations 1 holds.
Definition 2 The system ψ1, ψ2,P2 is a bayesian equilibrium if equation 3 holds.
2.2 Necessary conditions
2.2.1 Types of bayesian equilibria
We do not attempt to write here first order necessary conditions that a general
bayesian equilibrium should satisfy, because we shall only need a particular, and
simpler, version of the second form above.
Definition 3 A bayesian equilibrium where ψ1 is an invertible function, is called
separating (or revealing). Otherwise, the equilibrium is called pooling.
Remark 2
1. If a separating equilibrium is played, after player 1 has played player 2 is
exactly informed of the previously private information θ. The signal is said
to be “honest”.
2. Our models have two equilibria: a “mixed” equilibrium, separating in a
range of the private parameter, pooling in its complement, but essentially
behaving as a separating equilibrium, and a trivial pooling equilibrium.
2.2.2 Separating equilibrium of a pure signaling game
We consider a pure signaling game J1 : Θ × U1 × U2 → R, J2 : Θ × U2 → R,
signal s = u1 ∈ U1. Let ϕ : Θ→ U2 give the optimal control u2 knowing θ:
∀u2 ∈ U2 , J2(θ, ϕ(θ)) ≥ J2(θ, u2) .
We have implicitly assumed up to now that the set U1 of possible first player’s
decisions is independent on θ, however, this will not be true in our first model. But
this is critical only if an equilibrium strategy lies on the boundary of U1. We avoid
that problem with the following assumptions:
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Assumptions
1. Θ, U1 and U2 are subsets of R or R itself,
2
2. J1 ∈ C
1, J2 ∈ C
2,
3. J2 is locally strictly concave in u2 in a neighborhood of its maximum and
∂2J2
∂u22
(θ, ϕ(θ)) < 0 . (4)
4. There exists a bayesian equilibrium with, for all θ, ψ1(θ) in the interior of
U1 and ψ2 ◦ ψ1(θ) in the interior of U2. (
3)
Handicap principle Under these assumptions, the optimality of ψ1 implies
dJ1(θ, u1, ψ2(u1))
du1
=
(
∂J1
∂u1
+
∂J1
∂u2
ψ′2
)∣∣∣∣
(u1,u2)=(ψ1(θ),ψ2(ψ1(θ)))
= 0. (5)
Hence, the direct effect of u1 on J1 and its indirect effect through player two’s
response are necessarily of opposite signs.
Much of the literature fails to define precisely what is called “handicap princi-
ple”. We use this phrase for the following proposition, which is a corollary of the
above essentially trivial remark:
Proposition 1 If we assume that the aim of the signal is to obtain a favorable
response from the other player, then, under assumptions 1 to 4 above, its direct
effect ∂J1/∂u1 has to be negative at equilibrium.
2.2.3 Computing the equilibrium strategies
According to the hypothesis that the optimal decisions are interior decisions, we
have
∂J2
∂u2
(θ, ϕ(θ)) = 0
and, by the implicit function theorem,
ϕ′(θ) =
dϕ
dθ
= −
∂2J2
∂u2∂θ
(θ, ϕ(θ))
(
∂2J2
∂u22
(θ, ϕ(θ))
)−1
. (6)
2In our model, the females’ decision is a time function.
3Note that this assumption is violated in the case of “index signals” [9] to be discussed, as well
as in our trivial equilibrium.
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If the equilibrium is separating, the optimal ψ2 is
ψ2(u1) = ϕ(ψ
−1
1 (u1)) ,
and hence, according to the chain rule
ψ′2(u1) = ϕ
′(ψ−11 (u1))
1
ψ′1(θ)
.
Substituting this and equation (6) in (5), one obtains that for u1 = ψ1(θ),
0 =
dJ1(θ, u1, ψ2(u1))
du1
=
∂J1
∂u1
(θ, u1, ψ2(u1))−
∂J1
∂u2
(θ, u1, ψ2(u1))
∂2J2
∂u2∂θ
(θ, ψ2(u1))
∂2J2
∂u2
2
(θ, ψ2(u1))
1
ψ′1(θ)
,
hence
ψ′1(θ) =
∂J1(θ,ψ1(θ),ψ2(ψ1(θ)))
∂u2
∂J1(θ,ψ1(θ),ψ2(ψ1(θ)))
∂u1
∂2J2
∂u2∂θ
(θ, ψ2(u1))
∂2J2
∂u2
2
(θ, ψ2(u1))
. (7)
The point is that, as a rule, the first order necessary conditions yield a differential
equation on ψ1. There remains to choose an initial condition for it. As u1 is costly,
the best possible initial condition is the smallest possible one within the constraints
of the problem at hand.
Finally, notice that we know that, under our assumptions, both ∂J1/∂u1 and
∂2J2/∂u
2
2 have to be negative. Assuming that ∂J1/∂u2 is positive (hence also ψ
′
2),
then, it follows from equation (7) that the equilibrium signal is indeed monotonously
increasing, hence honest, as well as the receiver’s response, if, at equilibrium
∂2J2
∂u2∂θ
(θ, ψ2(θ)) > 0 .
This condition bears on the receiver’s marginal sensitivities. It looks different from
Getty [5] equation (5), but only because Getty writes his condition in terms of the
signaller’s resulting fitness taking into account the receiver’s response (P (a) in his
notation). The receiver’s criterion is implicit in his model, while it is explicit here.
3 Two models of sexual selection
3.1 The framework
Most previous studies have modelled fitness as the product of survivorship and
mating success, where survivorship is a lifetime measure of the expected number of
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breeding attempts. ([15]). Let therefore the quality of an individual male denote his
survivorship, more precisely the expected number of breeding seasons he will live
through, in the absence of the negative impact of the secondary sexual characters
used as a signal. The qualities of male individuals are distributed according to a
probability law P0, that we shall quickly assume uniform.
Quality will be denoted by q ∈ (q0, q1]. The latter quantity can indeed be
bounded above by q1 = 1 for instance, which means that the species consid-
ered live through a single breeding season (annual or semelparous species) [7],
or by a larger q1 for iteroparous species enjoying as a rule several reproductive
bouts. Grafen also considered that the expected number of breeding seasons can
be bounded below by a strictly positive value q0 > 0. It is obvious that from the
female point of view, q cannot be zero. Yet, it could definitely be arbitrarily close
to zero, implying q0 = 0, and we will see that this parameter has a great influence
on Grafen’s model.
To show why q0 has such an influence on Grafen’s model, we will compare
two closely related models. We call one the multiplicative signaling cost model,
since in this model, the measure of the signal σ ∈ [0, 1] is the factor by which the
survivorship L♂ of a male is reduced: L♂ = q(1− σ). This model will be shown
to be akin to Grafen’s, as opposed to the additive signaling cost model, also alluded
to in [5] who attributes it to [14], in which the measure of the signal s > 0 is the
quantity by which survivorship is reduced: L♂(q, s) = q− s. In this model, males
have negative fitness as soon as they signal greater than q. These two models could
be used to compare “index” (unfakeable) signaling with strategic (unconstrained
by quality) signaling [9]. Yet, we will focus on interior equilibria on the basis of
local stability conditions, so this dichotomy will not be relevant in this study. As a
last remark, we stress that in each model, contrary to [10] for instance, males vary
by their quality only; males of same quality “pay” the same amount for the same
signal.
In both cases, the expected number of successful matings per breeding season,
or mating success rate, is denoted Nm. It is a function of the signal, σ or s, and of
how females behave in response to it. To evaluate that number, we assume that the
breeding season is of length T each year; t is the time elapsed since the beginning
of the breeding season. We however neglect the event of a male dying during that
season. Male’s fitness therefore is F♂ = L♂Nm.
For each model, we shall consider two extreme cases, depending on whether
the limiting factor for the males, beyond being accepted by females, is their (con-
stant) potential reproduction rate (P.R.R.) µ, or the scarcity of females, measured
by an (increasing) operating sex ratio (O.S.R.) ω(t).
Each female meets males in a Poisson process of intensity λ. She observes the
signal exactly, and chooses a probabilitym = ϕ♀(σ) in the first model,m = ψ♀(s)
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in the second, to accept to mate. Her fitness will be taken to be the quality of the
male she will mate with, its expectation Q0 = F♀ being the same for all females.
After mating, she leaves the pool of females available for mating.
It will be convenient to use all along the following dimensionless parameters
k =
2
λT
, τ =
T − t
T
, (8)
where λT is the mean number of males encounter by females in one breeding
season.
3.2 Females’ behavior
In this section, we use the same notation s for s or σ.
3.2.1 Females’ strategy
According to the earlier introduction to signaling theory, we let χ(q) be the con-
jecture made by the females about the males’ strategy, i.e. χ−1(s), be her estimate
of a male’s quality given his signal s.
LetQ(t) be the expected quality of the male she will mate with for a female that
has not yet mated at time t. In the forthcoming infinitesimal time interval dt, she
will meet a male with a probability λ dt, whose quality q is distributed according
to the probability law P0, and displaying an a priori unknown signal s, and she will
accept to mate with him with a probability m, her choice, which may depend on t
and s. We therefore get
Q(t) = E[λ dtmq + (1− λ dtm)Q(t+ dt)] .
In the limit as dt→ 0, this yields
dQ
dt
+ λE[m(q −Q(t))] = 0 , Q(T ) = 0 .
(In this equation, m is allowed to be a random variable measurable on the sigma
algebra generated by q.) It follows from the theorem of comparison of the solu-
tions of ordinary differential equations that to maximize Q(0), the females should
maximize E[m(q −Q)], i.e. choose
m =
{
0 if q < Q(t) ,
1 if q ≥ Q(t) .
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However, they observe neither q nor Q. They will have to rely on q = χ−1(s), and
choose the threshold strategy
m = ψ♀(s; t) :=
{
0 if s < θ(t) ,
1 if s ≥ θ(t) .
(9)
with
θ(t) = χ(Q(t)) , (10)
whereQ(t) is calculated as the solution of the differential equation obtained on the
basis that s = χ(q), i.e. that q is exactly recovered from s. Let, for any X ∈ R,
[X]+ =
{
0 if X ≤ 0 ,
X if X > 0 .
The differential equation for Q(t) reads:
dQ
dt
+ λE[q −Q(t)]+ = 0 , Q(T ) = 0 ,
or, equivalently
dQ
dt
+ λE[q −Q(t) | q ≥ Q(t)]P0([Q(t), q1]) = 0 , Q(T ) = 0 .
To carry the calculations further, we make the following assumption:
Assumption The probability law P0 is uniform over [q0, q1].
To go further, we need to discuss whether Q(t) is smaller or larger than q0.
1. If Q ≤ q0, then
E[q −Q]+ =
q1 + q0
2
−Q ,
hence
dQ
dt
= −λ
(
q1 + q0
2
−Q
)
Q(T ) = 0 ,
and
Q(t) =
q0 + q1
2
(
1− e−λ(T−t)
)
from the time T0 at which Q(T0) = q0, i.e.
e−λ(T−T0) =
q1 − q0
q1 + q0
, (11)
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Figure 1: Curves Q(t)/q1, to the left, for q0 = 0, with various values of λT , to the
right, for λT = 8 and different values of q0/q1.
up to time T . We shall use the notation
τ0 :=
T − T0
T
=
k
2
ln
q1 + q0
q1 − q0
. (12)
2. If Q ≥ q0, then
E[q −Q]+ =
1
q1 − q0
∫ q1
Q
(q −Q) dq =
(q1 −Q)
2
2(q1 − q0)
,
hence
dQ
dt
= −λ
(q1 −Q)
2
2(q1 − q0)
, Q(T0) = q0 .
Integrating this last equation we summarize:
Q(t) =

q1
k q0
q1
T + T0 − t
kT + T0 − t
if t ≤ T0 ,
q0 + q1
2
(
1− e−λ(T−t)
)
if t ≥ T0 .
(13)
Notice that
∀t ∈ [0, T ] , Q(t) ≤ Q0 := q1
k q0
q1
T + T0
kT + T0
. (14)
Equations (9), (10), (11), and (13) define the females’ strategy in terms of their
conjecture χ about the males’ strategy. In figure 1, we have plotted curves of Q(t)
against t/T .
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3.2.2 Consequences for the males
A male displaying a signal s mates only when Q(t) ≤ χ−1(s), i.e. when t ≥ tm
with
τm :=
T − tm
T
=

1 if χ−1(s) ≥ Q0 ,
τ0 + k
χ−1(s)− q0
q1 − χ−1(s)
if χ−1(s) ≤ Q0 .
(15)
It will be useful in the sequel to note that, for q < Q0,
dτm
ds
= τ ′m = k
(
1−
q0
q1
)
q1
χ′(χ−1(s))(q1 − χ−1(s))2
. (16)
Another consequence is that the number of females available for mating de-
creases during the breeding season. At time t, there are n♀(t) unmated females.
Let N♀ = En♀. During an infinitesimal time interval dt, an expected number
N♀(t)λ dt of females meet a male, and a proportion (q1 − Q(t))/(q1 − q0) of
these males are accepted as mates, as long as Q < q0, i.e. for t < T0, and all
are accepted once t ≥ T0.The females that have accepted a mate leave the pool of
available females. Therefore we have for the expected number of available females
dN♀
dt
=
 −N♀λ
q1 −Q(t)
q1 − q0
= −N♀
2
kT + T0 − t
if t < T0 ,
−λN♀ if t ≥ T0 .
and therefore
N♀(t) =

N♀(0)
(
kT + T0 − t
kT + T0
)2
if t < T0 ,
N♀(0)
(
kT
kT + T0
)2 q1 − q0
q1 + q0
e−λ(t−T ) if t ≥ T0 .
(17)
3.3 Males’ strategy: multiplicative signaling cost
3.3.1 An abstract derivation
Notation We investigate our first model, i.e. one where the signal is σ ∈ [0, 1]
and the survivorship
L♂ = q(1− σ) , σ ∈ [0, 1] . (18)
We let q ∈ [q0, q1] with q0 > 0.
The females’ strategy is as above, and therefore tm(s) is given by equation (15)
and N♀(t) by (17). We denote σ = ϕ♂(q) the males’ strategy in this model.
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We use the notation
F♂(q, σ,m(·)) = L♂(q, σ)Nm(m(·)) ,
F̂♂(q, σ) := F♂(q, σ, ϕ♀(σ; ·)) = L♂(q, σ)Nm(ϕ♀(σ)) , (19)
and
ϕ♀(σ, t) = ϕˆ♀(χ
−1(σ), t) , N̂m(q) := Nm(ϕˆ♀(q, ·)) , (20)
so that
F̂♂(q, σ) = L♂(q, σ)N̂m(χ
−1(σ)) .
Deriving ϕ
♂
and F
♂
According to section 2, we derive ϕ♂(q) by differentiating
F̂♂ with respect to σ and equating to zero. Using (χ
−1)′(σ) = 1/χ′(χ−1(σ)), this
yields, for q < Q0:
∂F̂♂(q, σ)
∂σ
= −qN̂m(χ
−1(σ)) + q(1− σ)
N̂ ′m(χ
−1(σ))
χ′(χ−1(σ))
Replacing χ−1(σ) by q, χ by ϕ♂ and σ by ϕ♂(q), and equating to zero, we obtain
0 = −N̂m(q) + (1− ϕ♂(q))
N̂ ′m(q)
ϕ′
♂
(q)
,
or, equivalently
ϕ′
♂
(q)
1− ϕ♂(q)
=
N̂ ′m(q)
N̂m(q)
.
Using ϕ♂(0) = 0, it follows immediately that
(1− ϕ♂(q))N̂m(q) = N̂m(q0) , F̂♂(q, ϕ♂(q)) = qN̂m(q0) . (21)
When q ≥ Q0, there is no incentive for the males to signal more than for
q = Q0, since anyway, with this signal τm = 1. We let thus ϕ♂(q) = ϕ♂(Q0),
N̂m(q) = N̂m(Q0), so that (1 − ϕ♂(q))N̂m(q) = (1 − ϕ♂(Q0))N̂m(Q0) =
N̂m(q0), and equation (21) still holds.
3.3.2 Equilibrium solutions of two variants
P.R.R. as the limiting factor
In this first simpler variant, we deviate somewhat from the stated hypothesis that
males can mate an arbitrary number of times. We assume that the number of avail-
able females remains large and the meeting rate high, and that, once accepted by
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females, the limit on males’ number of matings is their potential reproduction rate
µ, limited, say, by the time it takes to produce sperm. Il this model, λ is the
rate of females meeting a male ready for mating. In this case, we simply have
Nm(σ) = µTτm(σ). Hence
1− ϕ♂(q) =
N̂m(q0)
N̂m(q)
=
τ0(q1 − q0)
τ0(q1 − q) + k(q − q0)
,
or
ϕ♂(q) =
k(q − q0)
τ0(q1 − q) + k(q − q0)
,
and
F̂♂(q, ϕ♂(q)) = qµTτ0 .
Remember that τ0 is given by equation (12), and is zero if q0 = 0. Therefore in
that case, we get ϕ♂(q) = 1 and F̂♂ = 0 for all q > 0, an absurd conclusion. We
must therefore assume q0 > 0. We shall come back to this point in the discussion.
Scarcity of the females as the limiting factor
In this variant, we come back to the hypothesis that the P.R.R. of males is large,
and that the only limit on their number of matings, once accepted by females, is
the increasing scarcity of mating opportunities while the breeding season goes on.
We ignore explicit infighting between males to get access to females, which is a
reasonable assumption as long as the initial operating sex ratio is low enough that
males seldom meet each other.
The population under consideration is assumed to be in a steady state, withN♂
males and N♀(0) females at the start of each breeding season. N♂ being constant,
so is the rate λ at which females meet males. Each useful meeting involves a male
and a female. Hence, the process of males meeting an available female is Poisson
with an intensity µ(t) such that N♂µ(t) = n♀(t)λ. Therefore, writing µ(0) = µ0,
µ(t) = λn♀(t)/N♂ = µ0n♀(t)/N♀(0) . (22)
We can now estimate the expected mating rate using (17) (and Fubini’s theorem):
Nm = E
∫ T
tm
µ(s) ds =
µ0
N♀(0)
∫ T
tm
N♀(s) ds
=
µ0
N♀(0)
[∫ T0
tm
N♀(s) ds+
∫ T
T0
N♀(s) ds
]
=
µ0k
3T 3
(kT + T0)2
[
q0
q1 + q0
+
1
3
(
1 +
τm − τ0
k
)3
−
1
3
]
.
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We use this with equation (15) to get
N̂m(q) =
K
3
[
3q0
q1 + q0
+
(
q1 − q0
q1 − q
)3
− 1
]
with
K :=
µ0T
3k3
(kT + T0)
2 ,
and finally
ϕ♂(q) =
(q1 − q0)
3 − (q1 − q)
3
(q1 − q0)3 −
q1−2q0
q1+q0
(q1 − q)3
,
F̂♂(q, ϕ♂(q)) = K
q0
q1 + q0
q .
Note that this model again displays the feature that if q0 = 0, then ϕ♂(q) = 1 and
F̂♂ = 0 for all q > 0, an absurd conclusion.
In figure 2, we have plotted the strategy ϕ♂, the relative survivorship L♂/q1
and the overall fitness F♂/q1 of males for λT = 8, and for different values of q0/q1
in the case of a limiting availability of females. We have included q0/q1 = .5 for
clarity, but we consider this value beyond a realistic model. See the foregoing
discussion.
3.4 Males’ strategy: additive signaling cost
In this section, we investigate a model somewhat more different from Grafen’s than
the first one, in that we assume that, denoting s the signal,
L♂ = q − s , s ∈ [0, q] . (23)
In this model, we will see that it is possible to take q0 = 0, and hence T0 = T ,
τ0 = 0, and Q0 = q1/(1 + k). We denote ϕ♂(s) the males’ strategy, and we use
the notation (19) mutatis mutandis.
3.4.1 Limiting P.R.R.
As for the first model, we first consider the case where µ is constant. The expected
number of matings in any season is µ(T − tm), and therefore the males’ fitness is
F̂♂(q, s) = µT (q − s)τm(s) .
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Figure 2: Multiplicative model: Males’ strategy ϕ♂ (top), relative survivorship
L♂/q1 (bottom left) and overall fitness F♂/q1 (bottom right) as a function of q/q1,
and for λT = 8 and several values of q0/q1.
Clearly, for χ−1(s) ≥ q1/(1+k), F♂ is strictly decreasing in s, so that it is useless
for the males to use a signal larger than χ(q1/1+k). For smaller s, we have, using
the fact that (χ−1)′ = (χ′)−1:
1
µTk
∂F̂♂
∂s
= −
χ−1(s)
q1 − χ−1(s)
+
χ−1(s)− s
(q1 − χ−1(s))χ′(χ−1(s))
Now, at equilibrium, s = ψ♂(q) = χ(q) so that also χ
−1(s) = q. Equating the
above derivative to zero, we get
ψ′
♂
(q) = q1
q − ψ♂(q)
q(q1 − q)
, ψ♂(0) = 0 . (24)
We initialize this differential equation at ψ♂(0) = 0 in order to keep s as small as
compatible with the equation.
It turns out that equation (24) has a closed form solution Ψ˜(q):
Ψ˜(q) = q1
[
1 +
q1 − q
q
ln
(
1−
q
q1
)]
if q 6= 0 ,
Ψ˜(0) = 0 .
(25)
It takes a power expansion in the neighborhood of q = 0 to check that indeed, this
Ψ˜ is continuous at 0, and also Ψ˜′(0) = 1/2 and Ψ˜′′(0) = 1/3.
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We therefore end up with definition (25) and
ψ♂(q) =

Ψ˜(q) if q ≤
q1
1 + k
,
Ψ˜
(
q1
1 + k
)
if q ≥
q1
1 + k
.
(26)
It remains to substitute this ψ♂ to χ in equation (10) to have the complete
bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game, which is pooling in the upper range
q ≥ q1/(1 + k), and separating for smaller q.
3.4.2 Scarcity of females as limiting factor
We investigate now the full model with an essentially unlimited P.R.R. of the males.
Their meeting rate of females is therefore given by (22). Using (17) with T0 = T ,
it follows that
Eµ(t) = µ0
(
k + τ
k + 1
)2
. (27)
We use this in evaluating the expected number of matings of a male in one
season as
Nm =
∫ T
tm
Eµ(t) dt = µ0T
∫ τm
0
(
k + τ
k + 1
)2
dτ =
µ0T
(k + 1)2
(k2τm + kτ
2
m +
1
3
τ3m)
and,
F̂♂(q, s) =
µ0T
(k + 1)2
(q − s)(k2τm(s) + kτm(s)
2 +
1
3
τm(s)
3),
where τm is still given by (15).
We may again notice that for q > q1/(1 + k), it is useless for the males to use
a signal greater than for q = q1/(1 + k). For lower q, we differentiate F̂♂ with
respect to s, and equate to zero, replacing χ−1(s) by q and s by ψ♂(q), to get
ψ′
♂
(q) = q31
q − ψ♂(q)
q(q1 − q)(q21 − q1q +
q2
3 )
, ψ♂(0) = 0 . (28)
Moreover, this stationary point is indeed a maximum, since F̂♂(q, 0) = F̂♂(q, q) =
0, and F̂♂(q, ·) is positive and differentiable for s ∈ (0, q). Thus, the stationary
point being unique, it necessarily is a maximum.
Unexpectedly, the differential equation (28) has a closed form, and even ratio-
nal, solution. Since a direct check that formula (29) does satisfy the equation is not
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so easy, we provide a direct derivation in the appendix. This closed form solution
of the differential equation (28) is
Ψ(q) = q1
27q51q + 18q
4
1q
2 + 9q31q
3 + 3q21q
4 − q6
2(27q61 + q
6)
(29)
One may notice that, on the one hand, both (24) and (28) imply that ψ′
♂
(0) = 1/2,
but the second one yields ψ′′
♂
(0) = 2/3, so that for small q, Ψ(q) is “above” Ψ˜(q).
On the other hand, for s, q ∈ (0, q1),
q1
q − s
q(q1 − q)
≤ q31
q − s
q(q1 − q)(q21 − q1q +
q2
2 )
so that, by a standard comparison principle, for all q in [0, q1], Ψ˜(q) ≤ Ψ(q). But
since ψ♂(q)must remain less than q, it follows that necessarily,Ψ(q1) = q1, which
is indeed satisfied by (29).
Finally, the equilibrium strategies of this model are given by equations (9),
(13), (10) where we substitute ψ♂ to χ, (29), and
ψ♂(q) =

Ψ(q) if q ≤
q1
k + 1
,
Ψ
(
q1
k + 1
)
if q ≥
q1
k + 1
.
(30)
In figure 3, we have plotted the strategy ψ♂/q1, the relative survivorship L♂/q1,
and the overall fitness F♂/q1 of males against q/q1, for λT = 8, for the case of a
limiting P.R.R. (fixed µ) or a limiting availability of females (variable µ).
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 General synthesis
The paradigm of bayesian equilibrium is a natural one to deal with the role of sex-
ually selected characters, this independently of whether the underlying mechanism
is one of direct benefit, as in [8], or indirect benefit as allowed by our model. In-
deed, what game theory teaches us is that, if these secondary sexual characters
have for unique, or main, role in the evolutionary process, to transmit information
about their bearer’s quality to the individuals of the other sex, and if they are not
physically constrained by that quality (see [9]), then at equilibrium it must be that
the direct effect of these characters is to lower the viability of their bearer, trad-
ing viability for greater sexual success. And the nature of a (separating) Bayesian
equilibrium is that the possibility of profitable cheating has been defined out.
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Figure 3: Additive model: Males’ strategy ψ♂/q1 (top), survivorship L♂/q1 (bot-
tom left), and fitness F♂/q1 (bottom right) as a function of q/q1, and for the two
variants : limiting P.R.R. (fixed µ) or limiting availability of females (variable µ)
for λT = 8.
Our models are based on reasonable simplifying assumptions. They allowed us
to obtain closed form solutions for all four variants, a useful feature if one wants to
discuss the effect of the parameters left: the mean number of males encounter by
females in one breeding season, λT , and the minimum to maximum survivorship
ratio q0/q1. The initial operating sex ratio λ/µ0 is less significant, only playing as
a multiplicative coefficient in males’ fitness F♂.
As expected, they do yield a large signaling with a correlative large reduction
in males’ viability, this in the absence of any “decreasing marginal cost of signal-
ing”, deemed necessary by [8], but in agreement with Getty [5] [6]. As a matter
of fact, in the additive signaling cost model, ∂2F♂/(∂q∂s) = 0, and in the mul-
tiplicative signaling cost model, the marginal cost of signaling increases with the
male’s quality.We claim that the only requirements for what we call the “handicap
paradox” to hold are those of our Proposition 1.
Lastly, our models exhibit a very low reproductive efficiency of males of low
or average quality. This begs the question of maintenance of quality diversity in
the population, a form of the lek paradox [11].
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3.5.2 Back to the main hypotheses
Beyond the hypothesis of the existence of a scalar “quality” for each male, reflect-
ing its survivorship and translating into fitness for the females that mate with him,
and of a scalar “signal” associated with quality, the simplicity of the model, and its
closed form solution, hinge on 2 main hypotheses:
1. Linear relationship between survivorship and female fitness. Once such a
correlation is hypothesized, a linear one is not less realistic than anything
else, and obeys in some sort a principle of parsimony, or of simplicity.
2. Uniform distribution of males’ quality. Although arbitrary, and difficult or
impossible to check in any particular case, it does not seem to be exceedingly
unrealistic. Indeed, we need a distribution with compact support, which
normal or log-normal distributions cannot provide. This can again be seen
as the application of a principle of parsimony.
3.5.3 Equilibrium selection as an open issue
The bayesian equilibrium outlined above is not unique. In all cases considered,
another bayesian equilibrium pair of strategies is the trivial one where females
accept all males, and males do not signal: ψ♀(t, s) = 1 for all t, s, and ψ♂(q) = 0
for all q. Indeed, if females do not expect males to signal, they ignore the signal if
any, and choose χ(q) = 0. Then males’ mating success is not influenced by their
signal, which only has a detrimental impact on their fitness, so that they should
keep it equal to 0, and therefore ψ♂(q) = χ(q).
This raises the issue of whether the nontrivial and trivial Bayesian equilibria
attract or repel evolutionary dynamics. This is discussed in the literature [2, 3], and
is amenable to mathematical analysis in the framework of adaptive dynamics [1]
or evolutionary games [17].
3.5.4 Some qualitative findings
We have stressed that the females’ strategy is essentially the same in all four cases,
accepting males with an observed quality no less than Q(t). The literature on sex-
ual selection has often introduced a variable measuring choosiness of females, dis-
cussing what cost it imparts on them. In our model with a time dependent threshold
strategy as females’ optimum strategy, an individual is more choosy than another
one if her threshold curve lies “above” the other one’s. We obtain a natural choice
of threshold in terms of males’ quality, since the curveQ(t) does not depend on the
female’s conjecture χ nor on the males’ behavior. It only depends on the expected
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number λT of encounters with a male in a breeding season and on the minimum to
maximum survivorship ratio q0/q1.
The larger the expected number λT of encounters per season the choosier the
females are, since they have more opportunities, and correlatively, the larger best
males’ signals are. Correlatively, for a fixed quality, the male fitness F♂ decreases
as the frequency of meetings λ increases. The explanation is that when λ gets
large, females become very choosy, and a male of a given quality is ignored for a
longer time during each breeding season; an effect reinforced by the fact that late
in the season, the number of available females drops. Perhaps an underappreciated,
but rather straightforward, implication of search theory 4. But of course, this fitness
increases proportionally to the inverse initial operational sex ratio µ0/λ.
Concerning the ratio q0/q1, the larger it is the choosier the females are, since
the average male’s quality increases with this ratio allowing the females to hope for
a better mate. But unexpectedly, in the multiplicative signaling cost model, males’
signals decrease when the ratio q0/q1 increases.
3.5.5 An artifact in Grafen’s model, and a new model to support his theory
Grafen [7] similarly noticed that “as q0 approaches zero, the general level of ad-
vertising increases indefinitely.” He quickly proposed an interpretation based on
the debatable argument that for a larger q0, a male of a given quality has less com-
petitors of lower quality to distinguish himself from. However, there is a simpler
and clearer explanation to what actually is an artifact. The point is that both in
the multiplicative signaling cost model and in Grafen’s, marginal signaling costs
vanish as q approaches zero. Indeed, in our multiplicative model, the marginal
cost is −∂L♂/∂σ = q, and in Grafen’s, where L♂ = q
σ in our notations, it is
−∂L♂/∂σ = −q
σ log(q) (remember that q ≤ q1 = 1 in Grafen’s). Since in both
models, limq→0−∂L♂/∂σ = 0 for any σ > 0, a male whose quality is almost
zero has little penalty for signaling almost as much as possible, which leads other
males to almost full signaling as well. This does not occur in the additive model,
since in this case−∂L♂/∂s = 1, which implies that the marginal cost of signaling
is never zero, whatever q and s. Hence the artifact in the multiplicative model.
In other words, in the multiplicative model akin to Grafen’s, we cannot let q0
tend to 0. As a matter of fact, in our formulas, if q0 = 0, then ϕ♂(q) = 1 for all
q > 0. Thus, not only is ϕ♂ discontinuous at zero, but worse, the survivorship is
zero for all males. This is of course an absurd result. Yet, it can be understood in
the following way: perturb somewhat the model by assuming that
L♂(q, σ) = q(1− σ) + ε
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relationship with search theory.
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for some small positive ε, but keep the constraint σ ≤ 1. And assume q0 = 0.
Then a bayesian equilibrium is
ϕ♂(0) arbitrary in [0, 1] ,
ϕ♂(q) = 1 ∀q > 0 .
As figure 2 shows, this is almost the equilibrium found for very small q0. Yet, it
was shown above that it depends very specifically on the fact that the multiplicative
form hides zero marginal signaling costs when quality tends to zero. Since the
additive model has, to our knowledge, no such hidden bias, we believe it makes a
better job as a minimal signaling model to start with.
It is nevertheless interesting to give a thought to the multiplicative model game
equilibrium for q0 = 0. Should this signal be termed honest [16]? Hardly so in
the sense that all males mimic the signal of the best quality males, but yes in the
sense that it does not deceive the females. As a matter of fact, in the framework
of bayesian equilibrium, “honesty” is merely a consequence of the existence of
a unique equilibrium signaling strategy that it is advantageous for the males to
use, given the female’s conjecture; in essence, existence of a profitable cheating
behavior has been defined out by definition 1 and equation (2). In the additive
model, the strategy is revealing in the range of qualities below a critical level, and
pooling, for high quality males. Yet being unique, it is honest even for these high
quality males, revealing that their quality is above the critical level, and it is a
sufficient information for the females.
4 Conclusion
Any model involves a trade-off between realism on the one hand and mathematical
simplicity and tractability on the other hand. We settled somewhat more on the
second side of this dilemma than Grafen [8], [7], allowing us to obtain closed form
solutions for all four variants investigated. Yet, our models display some interest-
ing features of the bayesian equilibria of signaling games of sexual selection. Of
course, we claim no quantitative results, as so many features of all these models
are over-simplifications of the real world: not only many phenomena, such as male
infighting, have been ignored, but more profoundly, a scalar “quality”, moreover
taken as a proxy for the benefit a female has to mate with this male, may be an
oversimplification of the biological processes at work, and a scalar signal is surely
so most often.
At least, comparing our two models let us propose an explanation of the curious
fact that previous models forbade a zero minimum quality, and we offer a simple
model in which this is not the case.
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A Solving for Ψ
We are interested here in the differential equation (28). For simplicity, we re-write
it in terms of the dimensionless r = q/q1 and ψ♂(q) = q1ψ(r). The equation now
writes
ψ′(r) =
r − ψ(r)
r(1− r)(1− r + r
2
3 )
, ψ(0) = 0 .
Write ψ as a power expansion in r, i.e.
ψ(r) =
∞∑
n=1
ψnr
n , ψ′(r) =
∞∑
n=1
nψnr
n−1 .
Write
r(1− r)(1− r +
r2
3
)ψ′(r) = r − ψ(r)
and identify terms of like power in r. This yields
ψ1 =
1
2
, ψ2 =
1
3
, ψ3 =
1
6
,
and for n > 3,
3(n+ 1)ψn = (n− 3)ψn−3 − 4ψn−2 + 6(n− 1)ψn−1 . (31)
We consider now ψ(r) + 1/2, (i.e. we add a coefficient ψ0 = 1/2), we compute
the 17 first coefficients ψn and write them in the following table, with six columns
labelled by the powers of r as a function of the line number ℓ starting at 0:
ℓ 6ℓ− 1 6ℓ 6ℓ+ 1 6ℓ+ 2 6ℓ+ 3 6ℓ+ 4
0 0 12
1
2
1
3
1
2×3
1
2×32
1 0 −1
2×33
−1
2×33
−1
34
−1
2×34
−1
2×35
2 0 1
2×36
1
2×36
1
37
1
2×37
1
2×38
This suggests the following general rule:
ψ6ℓ−1 = 0, 2ψ6ℓ = 2ψ6ℓ+1 = 3ψ6ℓ+2 = 6ψℓ+3 = 18ψ6ℓ+4 =
(−1)ℓ
33ℓ
That these values satisfy the recurrence relation (31) can easily be checked by
straightforward, if tedious, calculation. It follows that
ψ(r) +
1
2
=
(
1
2
+
r
2
+
r2
3
+
r3
6
+
r4
18
) ∞∑
ℓ=0
(
−r6
27
)ℓ
=
(
1
2
+
r
2
+
r2
3
+
r3
6
+
r4
18
)
1
1 + r
6
27
,
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from which formula (29) follows. (As a cross check, we performed a numerical
integration with a Runge Kutta scheme of order 4 and a step size of 0.01, starting
from r = 0.05 and ψ(0.05) estimated with a tenth order power expansion. The
result agreed with the closed form formula up to the fifth decimal place at r = 1.)
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